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Nominal vs Real Wage Rigidities  
in New Keynesian Models with Hiring Costs: 
a Bayesian Evaluation 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Two recent contributions by Blanchard and Galì (2006a, 2006b) recommend the introduction of 
labor market frictions and real wage rigidities in the baseline New Keynesian model (BNKM 
hereafter). This extended model is receiving increasing attention in the literature as it allows to 
overcome three of the main drawbacks of the standard New Keynesian (NK) model: first, the 
lack of involuntary unemployment, due to the assumption of a Walrasian labor market which 
guarantees that workers are always on their labor supply
1; second, the unappealing feature of the 
“divine coincidence” between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output 
gap (Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000; Blanchard and Gali, 2006a, 2006b)
2; third, the inability 
to generate inflation inertia beyond that inherited from the output gap, a feature which is 
inconsistent with the degree of inflation persistence found in the data.
3 Since marginal costs are 
                                                 
1 In the BNKM changes in total labor input are equivalent to changes in hours per worker and the labor 
force never changes, contradicting the empirical evidence: as stressed by Trigari (2005) the labor input 
adjusts along both the extensive and the intensive margin. Blanchard and Galì (2006b) show that the 
introduction of labor market imperfections in the NK theoretical apparatus delivers non Pareto-optimal 
fluctuations in employment and involuntary unemployment at the steady state. 
 
2 Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) introduce a Calvo-type nominal wage stickiness into a NK model 
with staggered prices and show that it generates a policy tradeoff among the objectives of stabilizing the 
output gap, price inflation, and wage inflation. Blanchard and Gali (2006a, 2006b) highlight the 
dependence of the optimal policy design on the interaction between real imperfections and shocks, and 
demonstrate that when real wage rigidities are introduced into the BNKM, the central bank faces a trade-
off between its stabilization objectives. 
  
3 A growing theoretical literature obtains inflation persistence by adding additional ingredients to price 
staggering. For example, Gust (1997) shows that persistence can be improved by assuming imperfect 
inter-sector capital mobility; Kiley (1997) suggests that an obstacle to get persistence comes from 
implausibly large degrees of increasing returns at the firm level; Bergin and Feenstra (1998) document  
  1
the driving force of inflation in the NK Phillips Curve, wage rigidities generate inflation inertia 
because of their permanent effects on marginal costs.
4 
The ability of the extended framework to account for other salient features of business cycle 
dynamics remains however questionable. The NK model with labor market imperfections still 
lacks substantial empirical testing and deeper insights in its dynamic properties.   
In this paper we consider the Blanchard and Galì (2006b) model (BGM hereafter) properties, 
from both a theoretical and empirical point of view, and show that its performances heavily rely 
upon how wage rigidities are modeled. In particular, we demonstrate that the real wage rigidity 
hypothesis hampers the emergence of the highly debated “productivity-employment puzzle” 
(Galì, 1999), and that, by imposing a constant degree of real stickiness, it generates excess real 
wage smoothness, leading to a wrong nominal wage response to supply shocks (see Section 2 
for a more detailed discussion).  
From a theoretical point of view, we first show that the NK model with labor market frictions 
proposed by Blanchard and Galì (2006b) can be made consistent with the productivity-
employment puzzle by considering nominal rather than real wage rigidities, together with 
Calvo-type price stickiness. We also show that, with this modification, the model can provide a 
better account of observed real and nominal wage fluctuations over the cycle.  
From the empirical point of view, we then evaluate which of the two model alternatives 
outperforms the other. To this aim, we provide an empirical comparison between the 
performances of the BGM and those of a substantially equivalent model structure considering 
nominal wage rigidities. We employ US quarterly data and perform a careful empirical analysis 
of the mechanisms through which nominal and real wage rigidities drive business cycle 
fluctuations.  
Given the complexity and nonlinearity of the models, for their empirical evaluation we 
implement a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain estimation procedure (MCMC) in the spirit 
                                                                                                                                                                  
that more persistence can be obtained by choosing a non CES production function with factor specificity 
featured by a sufficiently large share of fixed factors. 
  
4 Employing a right-to-manage Nash wage bargaining framework and real wage rigidities, Cristoffel and 
Linzert (2005) overcome this empirical weakness. They show that while in a right to manage bargaining 
framework a rigid real wage contributes to explaining persistent inflation (as wages feed directly into 
firm’s marginal costs), the channel from wages to inflation is missing under the assumption of an efficient 
bargaining model. Blanchard and Galì (2006a) obtain inflation inertia as a side result of their extended 
NK model by assuming real wage rigidities. 
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of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).  MCMC estimation and simulation is preceded by a 
stability mapping analysis from which we derive important indications for initializing 
estimation within the parameters space that fulfills the stability requirements.  
Model selection is based on the Bayes factor, which essentially summarizes the posterior 
evidence in favor of one model specification with respect to the other. On this respect, our 
model selection analysis is similar to that proposed by Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez (2005), who 
use a Bayesian approach to compare three extensions of the BNKM.  
From the analysis of posterior impulse responses, we derive that the way wage rigidities are 
modeled matters substantially. The model with staggered nominal wage contracts replicates the 
dynamic effects of technology shocks that the empirical literature has addressed when 
employing weakly identified model structures as the VAR. From Bayesian impulse responses 
we obtain that the supply shock leads to a fall of employment, a rise in the real wage and a 
weaker  increase in the nominal wage. On the contrary, the model with real wage rigidities 
highlights the existence of a trade-off between the degree of real rigidity and the emergence of 
the puzzle. To account for the negative correlation between productivity and employment, the 
estimated degree of real wage stickiness is virtually zero. From Bayesian model comparison we 
finally obtain that the nominal wage rigidities version of the model has to be preferred to the 
BGM with labor market frictions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the empirical literature on the 
effects of technology shocks on labor market dynamics and recalls the BNKM ability to account 
for the productivity-employment puzzle. Section 3 gives the analytical derivation of the nominal 
wage rigidities model and highlights the main differences from the benchmark model 
considering real rigidities. The economic mechanisms that are responsible for the different 
dynamic properties of the models are discussed by means of stochastic simulations, with 
particular reference to the assessment of the employment response to technology shocks. 
Section 4 briefly introduces the Bayesian analysis, with a specific focus on Monte Carlo 
Filtering techniques and on the Bayes factor as an approach to model comparison. Data and 
prior distribution hypotheses are discussed in detail. Section 5 summarizes our results, and 
shows that Bayesian model comparison provides evidence in favor of the nominal wage 
rigidities model specification. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Technology shocks and labor market dynamics in the BNKM 
 
The analysis of the labor market response to supply shocks has received increasing attention in 
the recent literature on macro-dynamics. These contributions follow an abundant empirical 
production showing that the mechanisms of transmission of supply shocks do not always work 
in accordance with the standard RBC theoretical predictions on economic fluctuations.  
Great part of this literature has addressed the productivity-employment nexus. The emergence 
of a “productivity-employment puzzle” has been originally addressed by Hansen and Wright 
(1992), who noticed the existence of a weak or negative unconditional (sample) correlation 
between productivity and employment. More recently, the analysis of the employment effects of 
technology shocks received new theoretical vigour, supported by abundant empirical emphasis 
on the negative conditional correlation between productivity and hours worked (Galì, 1999; 
Basu, Fernald and Kimball, 1998, 2004; Francis and Ramey, 2005; Fernald, 2004).
5 
Specifically, the literature on the subject matter has shown that, once empirical shocks in vector 
autoregressions are identified as “technological” according to broadly accepted theoretical 
indications, the employment (hours) simulated response turns out negative in the short to 
medium run.
6 
Even if these empirical studies employed data on different sample periods, countries and 
methodologies, their findings appeared remarkably consistent. In response to a positive 
technology shock we observe: (i) a short-run drop (increase) in employment (unemployment); 
(ii) an increase in real wages, (iii) a weak response of nominal wages. 
The empirical evidence supporting the productivity-employment puzzle has serious theoretical 
implications, since the pro-cyclicality of output and labor supply is a key feature of the 
frictionless Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. The standard prediction that supply shocks have 
                                                 
5 The term conditional is employed to indicate an identified source of shock (Galì, 1999). 
 
6 Two different empirical approaches characterize the study of the effects of technology shocks on labor 
market dynamics. On the one side, Basu and Fernald (1997), Basu and Kimball (1997), Basu, Fernald and 
Kimball (2004) use direct measures of technology shocks obtained by controlling for non-technological 
effects in the aggregate Solow residual. On the other side, following the approach developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989), other authors estimate structural VARs with long run identifying restrictions. 
The identification strategy adopted by Gamber and Joutz (1993), Gali (1999) and Francis and Ramey 
(2005) is based on the theoretical assumption that only technology shocks have permanent effects on 
productivity. 
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non-negative effects on employment reflects the technology-related shifts in the labor demand 
schedule combined with an upward sloping labor supply (Galì, 1999). The productivity-
employment puzzle thus challenges a crucial element of the RBC theory.  
Galì (1999) and Galì and Rabanal (2004) show that the puzzling evidence is theoretically 
consistent with a sticky price economy in which monetary policy is not fully accommodative. 
When a technology shock hits the economy, productivity rises immediately, while the negative 
inflation response is weak; firms will thus face a sluggish response of aggregate demand, 
leading to a decline in the level of employment.
7 In other terms, the productivity-employment 
puzzle is explained by the fact that, following an increase in productivity, flexible prices output 
rises more than actual output. A necessary condition is the sticky price assumption. Staggered 
price setting by firms prevents prices from optimally decreasing: even if all firms experience a 
decline in their marginal cost, only a fraction of them lowers prices in the short run.
8 
Despite the fact that the puzzle is an almost standard outcome in recent NK-DSGE modelling, 
its relevance still remains an open issue. Part of the recent empirical literature questioned the 
very existence of the puzzle. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003) argue that it 
originates in the wrong consideration of a unit root in hours worked time series, leading to over-
differencing and biased estimates. Other authors criticized the empirical results supporting the 
puzzle for being potentially flawed by the omitted variables bias arising with small SVAR 
estimates (Cooley and Dwyer, 1998; Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust, 2004; Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan, 2005).  
                                                 
7 By contrast, Francis and Ramey (2002) show that the negative conditional correlation between 
productivity and employment is consistent with a flexible price economy. To maintain that the puzzling 
response of hours does not rule out optimal labour supply choices, they assume that its ultimate cause is 
the presence of relevant behavioural frictions on the demand-side, i.e., consumption habits and capital 
adjustment costs. Because of their relative aversion to revise consumption and investment plans, 
households are forced to spend their increased income in leisure. 
 
8 However, the sticky price economy hypothesis is only necessary. Nominal rigidities are not, by 
themselves, the cause of the observed employment response in the BNKM. The equilibrium response of 
employment to a supply shock also depends on the monetary authorities’ degree of accommodation. If 
one assumes that monetary authorities react to output and not to the output gap - this policy being less 
accommodative than the optimal one - a negative response of employment to a productivity improvement 
will be experienced (Gali and Rabanal, 2004). The additional hypothesis of weak monetary 
accommodation is thus the sufficient condition for observing the productivity-employment puzzle in the 
BNKM. 
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In our opinion, the two critical arguments are neither general nor destructive. With respect to the 
former, it has been shown that the puzzle can be obtained even considering stationary hours 
when trend breaks in productivity are taken into account (Fernald, 2007).
9  
Considering the second critical argument, it can be shown that the omitted variables bias is not 
an irreducible feature of the VAR representation of DSGE models; it emerges as a standard 
approximation problem arising when the omitted variables are Granger-causal, or not linked by 
static identities to the maintained set (Pagan, 2007).
10 Moreover, the identification strategy 
based on signs restrictions (Uhlig, 1999) proposed by some of the opponents of the puzzle is not 
exempt from even more serious limitations, questioning the ability of the procedure to be 
actually identifying (Pagan, 2007). Even not considering such limitations, Francis, Owyang, and 
Theodorou (2003) show that a variant of the standard sign restrictions approach replicates the 
negative employment response that is generally found with SVARs based on long-run 
restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989). 
The robustness of these findings raises a theoretical challenge and suggests that the predictions 
on the unemployment effects of productivity shocks may be taken as a fundamental criterion for 
evaluating different business cycle theories (Basu 1998, Gali and Rabanal 2004, Basu, Fernald 
and Kimball 2004). Under this perspective, one of the main merits of the BNKM lies in its 
ability to match the negative correlation found in the data between firms’ use of labor and 
identified supply shocks. 
An additional aspect in the assessment of the empirical consistency of the NK model is the 
predicted response of the wage to a positive supply shock. Unfortunately, in the BNKM the real 
and nominal wage responses are ambiguous, since they depend on the relative strength of the 
income effect (negatively related to price stickiness and positively related to the degree of 
monetary policy accommodation) and the substitution effect (positively related to the curvature 
                                                 
9 The same result is obtained by Francis and Ramey (2005), who employ the ratio between annual hours 
data for the entire 20
th century and population aged between 16 and 65 not enrolled by the government: 
this labor input series resulted largely stationary, guaranteeing the appropriateness of the hours-in-levels 
VAR representation advanced by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vifugsson (2003). In addition, Galì (2005) 
provides theoretical arguments and abundant empirical evidence on the fact that post-war hours raw data 
favour the unit root hypothesis.  
 
10 It is a well-known fact that in such cases there is no finite order VAR approximation and a VARMA 
model is needed (Zellner and Palm, 1974; Wallis, 1977). The problem can be solved by appropriately 
augmenting the VAR dimensionality; if this were not an option, the bias can be controlled by augmenting 
the lag order of the VAR (Pagan, 2007). 
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coefficient of the labor supply curve).
11 As will be evident in the following section, the BGM 
does not fully overcome this empirical inconsistency, since the assumption of a weak direct 
relation between real wages and productivity implies a negative response of the nominal wage 
to supply shocks. 
For these reasons, we consider two alternative theoretical formulations of the wage dynamics, 
maintain that the productivity-employment puzzle is a likely feature of macro-dynamics, and 
adopt an empirical strategy that is robust to the abovementioned methodological critiques. Our 
estimates are in fact based on two fully structural NK-DSGE models, one of which encompasses 
the RBC prediction of a positive employment response to the supply shock as the standard 
result.  
In the following sections we will compare the theoretical and empirical performances of the 
BGM with those of a modified version in which nominal wage rigidities are substituted to real 
wage rigidities. Along with the main issue of the productivity-employment puzzle, the rich 
structure of the models will also enhance the analysis of the their consistency with the observed 
facts on nominal and real wage fluctuations.    
 
 
3.  The models 
For comparative reasons, we first review the main analytical features of the BGM, on the 
grounds that the nominal wage rigidities version is equivalent on many respects. Given our 
strong empirical bearing, we will assume CRRA utility in the place of logarithmic utility to 
improve model fit and consider seven exogenous shocks to enhance the empirical identification 
of the model.     
 
3.1.  The model with real wage rigidities (Model A) 
 
At date zero, households maximize the following CRRA utility function: 
                                                         ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
−
+ −
∑ φ
χ
σ
ξ β
φ σ
1 1
1 1
0
t
t
t
t
t N C
E                                             (1) 
                                                 
11 Liu and Phaneuf (2004) show that, in contrast with the empirical findings from weakly identified 
VARs, the BNKM predicts that the real wage falls along with employment for a set of plausible 
parameter values. 
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where  t C is a CES function over a continuum of goods with elasticity of substitution  p ε and 
()
1
0
t NN i ≡∫ ,  1 0 ≤ ≤ t N , is the fraction of household members who are employed. β  is the 
intertemporal discount factor and σ  and φ  are the standard CRRA curvature parameters for 
consumption and labor supply.  t χ  and  t ξ  are preferences shocks, respectively to the disutility 
of work and to consumption utility.  
Goods are produced employing a CRS production function  ( )( ) i N A i Y t t t = , where  [] 1 , 0 ∈ i  
indexes a continuum of firms, each producing a differentiated good, and  t A  is the level of 
technology. Employment in firm i evolves according to the dynamic equation: 
                                                        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 tt t Ni N i Hi δ − =− +                                         (2) 
where  () 1 , 0 ∈ δ  is an exogenous separation rate denoting the transition probability of an 
employed worker in t-1 to the pool of jobless workers at the beginning of period t, and  ( ) t Hi  
is the fraction of unemployed workers hired by firm i in period t.  1 tt uN = −  denotes the size 
of the pool of jobless individuals at the end of period t, after hiring takes place. Given these 
assumptions, the job finding rate  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ≡ t t t U H x  can be expressed as an index of labor 
market tightness signalling that each additional job searcher creates a negative search externality 
for the other searchers.
12      
Labor market frictions are introduced in the form of hiring costs, expressed as an increasing 
function of labor market tightness. Letting  t G  be the cost per hire faced by each firm, it is 
assumed that 
h
t t t t Bx A G η
α = ,   where  0 ≥ α  and  1 < B δ  are parameters, and 
h
t η  is the shock to 
the hiring cost. As a consequence, 
t
t
t A
G
g ≡ , defines the cost per hire normalized by 
productivity. The resulting aggregate resources constraint is: 
                                                                 t t t t H G Y C − =                                               (3) 
                                                 
12 Search and matching models are characterized by the presence of two typical externalities: congestion 
externalities and labor market externalities.  The congestion externality (each firm posting a vacancy 
creates a negative congestion externality for the other firms since an additional vacancy decreases the 
chance for other firms to fill their vacancies) is absent in this model, even if it can be conceived of as 
implicitly present in the form of hiring costs. 
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Following Calvo (1989), each period only a fraction of firms ( ) p θ − 1 , randomly selected, can 
reset their prices. Log-linearization around a zero inflation steady state of the optimal price 
setting rule and the price index equation yields the standard NKPC: 
                                           {} ( )( ) dp
t t
p
p p
t t t c m E η
θ
βθ θ
π β π +
− −
+ = + ˆ
1 1
1                                (4) 
where  t c mˆ is the log-deviation of the real marginal cost from its steady state value and  
dp
t η is a 
standard cost push shock. From now on, variables with a “hat” will denote log-deviations from 
steady state values, while variables indexed with “ss” will indicate steady state values. 
The real marginal costs equation is that in the BGM, here augmented with a hiring cost shock: 
                         
()
()
⎪ ⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
− − + = + +
+ +
h
t t
t
t
t
t
t
h
t t
t
real
t
t Bx
A
A
C
C
E Bx
A
w
mc 1 1
1 1
1 η δ β η
α
σ
σ
α .                               (5) 
Equation (5) establishes a direct link between marginal costs and the normalized total labor cost, 
the latter defined by the real wage to productivity ratio and the normalized hiring cost 
t
h
t t g Bx = η
α .  
Concerning the real wage determination hypothesis, the rigidity in the BGM is imposed in a 
rather ad-hoc way:  () γ − Θ =
1
t
real
t A w , where  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ γ  is an index of the degree of real wage 
rigidity and  0 > Θ  is a constant that determines the real wage from the technology-related 
productivity measure, and thus defines the employment level at the steady state.
13 By assuming 
() () [ ]
α γ δ β ss Bx A − − − = Θ 1 1 1 , the steady state real wage to productivity ratio is obtained from 
the deep parameters of the model, i.e.  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
α δ β ss
real
ss Bx A w − − − = 1 1 1.  Note that since a real 
rigidity is assumed, it will persist in the steady state:  ( ) γ − Θ =
1
ss
real
ss A w . Furthermore, in the log-
linearized version of equation (5) the normalized real wage disappears, since  () γ − Θ = t t
real
t A A w , 
i.e., it is a constant share of productivity.  
Blanchard and Galì (2006b) adopt three alternative monetary policy functions to close their 
model: two extreme policies - i.e. strict inflation targeting and unemployment stabilization - and 
an optimal policy rule. Since they show that a standard Taylor rule provides a satisfying 
                                                 
13 Alternative but related formalizations of real wage rigidities can be found in a model with variable 
effort and shirking (Felices , 2005), and in a model with rule-of-thumb wage setters Rabanal (2004). See 
also Christoffel and Linzert (2005). 
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approximation of the optimal rule, in our model specification the following policy reaction rule 
closes the model: 
                                                  ( ) t t u t t t dp t u E r λ ϕ π π ϕ β + − − + − = + ˆ ˆ log
*
1                            (6) 
where  t λ and 
*
t π denote, respectively, the monetary policy shock and the inflation target shock. 
For identification purposes, we assume that the behavior of the resulting system of linear 
rational expectations equations is driven by seven exogenous shocks (a detailed description of 
these shocks is given in section 4.3), assumed to follow independent first-order autoregressive 
processes. The equations fully describing the dynamics of the model are reported in Table 1. 
 
3.2  The model with nominal wage rigidities (Model B) 
 
To enhance model comparability, in the nominal wage rigidities variant of the BGM we assume 
an equivalent analytical structure for households’ utility, firms’ behavior and labor market 
frictions. Utility, employment, resource constraints, price dynamics and marginal costs are thus 
described by equations (1)-(5). We also assume that monetary authorities adopt the same policy 
reaction rule (6).   
The labor market is instead modeled as a duplicate of the goods market: households supply 
differentiated labor services in a monopolistic competitive market, which guarantees a 
monopoly power over the wage.  Labor suppliers face a demand that depends on the pre-set 
nominal wage relative to the aggregate nominal  wage rate. We assume a continuum of 
differentiated labor services, indexed by  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ j , all of which are used by each firm. Each 
household is specialized in one type of labor and sets the nominal wage at which its members 
are willing to supply specialized labor services to firms. Alternatively, we can imagine a 
continuum of monopoly unions, each representative of a unit measure of households specialized 
in a given labor service, setting the nominal wage on their behalf.  
Letting  () j i Nt ,  denote the quantity of type j labor employed by firm i in period t , and  ( ) , i Nt  
be an index of the labor input used by firm i, we obtain the demand schedule for each firm i and 
labor type j  ()() ( ) i N W w j i N t t t j t
w ε − = , ,  [ ] 1 , 0 , ∈ ∀ j i , where 
w wdj w W t j t
ε ε − −
⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ≡ ∫
1
1
1
0
1
, is the 
aggregate wage rate and  w ε  is the elasticity of substitution among labor types.  
  10
Households/unions set nominal wages in staggered contracts: only a randomly drawn fraction of 
them  () w θ − 1  renegotiate the wage contract for their labor type in each period. In line with the 
hypotheses on Calvo-pricing adopted for the goods sector, the frequency of the nominal wage 
adjustment process in not under the control of households/unions.   
Now consider a household re-optimizing its wage in period t and let 
*
t w  denote the newly set 
nominal wage. We assume that in any period t in which the household is able to reset its 
nominal wage contract it maximizes the expected discounted sum of payoffs over the period 
during which the wage remains unchanged. The sum of discounted payoffs depends on the gap 
between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption, i.e. 
on the markup the household charges over the Pareto-optimal wage when selling its labor 
services. 
Hence, the household able to renegotiate the wage for its labor type solves the following 
maximization problem: 
                                   
()
i t
i t
t
t i t
t i t real
i t
t i t
t i t
i t
t
t i
i
w t
w
N
W
w
N t s
N
W
mrs
N
W
w
r
E
w
t
+
−
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
∞
=
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
+ ∑
ε
θ
*
/
/
/
/
0
. .
1
1
max
                 (7) 
where 
σ
β
−
+
+
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
=
+ t
i t i
i t C
C
r 1
1
 and  ( )
() t i t t i t c
t i t t i t n
t i t N C U
N C U
mrs
/ /
/ /
/ ,
,
+ +
+ +
+ − =  denotes the marginal rate of 
substitution between labor and consumption in period  i t +  for the household resetting the wage 
in period t.  t i t C / +  and  t i t N / +  respectively define consumption and labor in period  i t +  of a 
household that had its last wage set in period t. Since utility is separable in consumption and 
labor, and given the assumption of complete markets, we have that  i t t i t C C + + = /  for i = 0,1,2,… 
(Gali, 2007). This yields the following FOC
 : 
                                      
()
φ ε
ε σ
ε φ ε σ
β θ
β θ
ε
ε
w
w
w w
i
i t i t i t
i i
w t
i
i t real
i t
i t
i t i t
i i
w t
w
w
t
W N C E
W
W
mrs
N C E
w
+
∞
=
−
+ +
−
+
∞
=
+
+
+
+
+
−
+
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
=
∑
∑
1
1
0
1
0 *
1
                   (8)  
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where  ( )
() i t i t c
i t i t n
i t N C U
N C U
mrs
+ +
+ +
+ − =
,
,
  defines the average marginal rate of substitution between 
labor and consumption, and the following relation holds: 
φ εw
i t
t
i t t i t W
w
mrs mrs
−
+
+ + ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
*
/ .  
Equation (8) highlights that 
*
t w  is increasing in the expected average marginal disutility of labor 
in terms of goods over the life of the wage. 
From the previous equation we obtain that at the steady state  ( ) mrs W w
real μ = , where 
1 −
≡
w
w
w ε
ε
μ  is the desired gross markup. After some algebra, we can obtain an alternative 
specification of the aggregate wage index, highlighting its relations with the wage Calvo 
parameter  w θ  and the elasticity of substitution among different labor types  w ε :  
                                              ()
w w w
t w t w t w W W
ε ε ε θ θ
− − −
− ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + =
1
1
1 * 1
1 ) 1 ( .                            (9) 
From the equations above, the following nominal and real wage inflation equations are 
obtained: 
                          () () () ( ) () ( ) t
real
t t t t
w w
w w w
t t
w
t w c n E χ ξ σ φ
φ ε θ
βθ θ
π β π + − − +
+
− −
+ = + ˆ ˆ ˆ
) 1 (
1 1
1                     (10)  
                                                             ( ) ( )
t
w
t
wreal
t π π π − =                                                         (11) 
Note that nominal wage inflation depends positively on the difference between the log-
deviations of the marginal rate of substitution ( ) t t c n ˆ ˆ σ φ +  and the real wage. The intuition 
behind equation (10) is straightforward: when the average nominal wage in the economy is 
below the level which is consistent with maintaining (on average) the desired markup, 
households able to renegotiate increase their nominal wage and this leads to a positive wage 
inflation.  
The level of marginal costs is described by equation (5) of Model A. However, since the real 
wage is no longer a constant share of productivity, it does not cancel-out in the log-linearized 
version, in which a direct link between marginal costs and the wage-productivity gap is now 
present.    
The dynamic properties of the model are given by the log-linearized versions of the system’s 
equations: equations I-V and IX-XVII of Model A in Table 1 and the three equations of Table 2  
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defining, respectively, nominal wage inflation (10), real wage inflation (11) and linearized real 
marginal costs, obtained from equation (5) of Model A. 
 
3.3  Simulated  dynamic properties of the models  
 
The theoretical dynamic properties of models A and B are studied employing stochastic 
simulations, focusing on the transmission mechanisms of technology shocks, and paying 
particular attention to their effects on employment and wage dynamics. To enhance the 
comparability of results, we adopt the same calibration for the parameters of the equations the 
two models have in common. Following the widely accepted indications of the literature, we 
assume  β  = 0.99 (consistent with a 4 percent real interest rate),   1 = σ .0, φ  = 1 and  p ε = 6 
(consistent with a 20% gross steady state markup). The share of firms that reset their optimal 
price each period is 25%, thus  . 75 . 0 = p θ  The separation rate and the monetary policy reaction 
rule parameters are, respectively  08 . 0 = δ ,  u ϕ  = 0.6 and  π ϕ  = 1.5 (Blanchard and Galì, 2006b).  
Finally, the autoregressive coefficient of the technology shock  a ρ  is fixed at 0.9. Concerning 
labor market frictions parameters, we follow Blanchard and Gali (2006b) and assume α  = 1, 
ss x = 0.7 and B = 0.11.  
The calibration of models A and B differs only with respect to the parameters defining the 
degree of real vs nominal wage rigidity. In Model A the real wage rigidity parameter γ  is fixed 
at  5 . 0 ,
14 while in Model B we have to choose reasonable values for the wage Calvo parameter 
and for the elasticity of substitution among differentiated labor services. Following the standard 
practice, we assume that  , 75 . 0 = = p w θ θ  and  6 = = p w ε ε ; the latter assumption, that is 
consistent with a 20% workers’ mark-up, implies that workers and producers have the same 
monopoly powers.  
Results from our calibration exercise are summarized in Figure 1. The main outcome is that, 
contrary to the BNKM, the model with real  wage rigidity predicts a positive conditional 
correlation between employment and productivity. Coherently, the hiring cost and the job 
finding rate increase. Moreover, the model predicts a substantial drop in the (flexible) nominal 
                                                 
14 Blanchard and Gali (2006) suggest that γ  can be obtained through a regression of real wage growth on 
productivity growth. According to the results of such regression,γ  lies between 0.6 and 0.7. 
  
  13
wage, contradicting the empirical evidence of a moderate positive response. This happens 
because the weak response of the real wage, due to the rigidity we have imposed, forces the 
nominal wage to decrease with the price level. In Figure 1 we also report the response of 
inflation and of the so-called “price markup”  ( )
t
real
t l mp w ˆ ˆ −  (Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido, 
2002). As it will be clarified below, this measure plays a fundamental role in the determination 
of the dynamic properties of the model.  
Conversely, the model with staggered nominal  wage contracts is consistent with the 
productivity-employment puzzle addressed in the empirical literature: a technology shock leads 
to a medium run fall of employment. Furthermore, Model B predicts that the technology shock 
is followed by a rise in the real wage and by a (weaker) increase in the nominal wage. 
Consequently, the job finding rate and hiring costs fall. 
The supply shock leads to a negative short-run response of the gap between the real wage and 
the marginal product of labor (price markup). Since prices adjust to the price markup (via the 
marginal cost), price inflation decreases. The nominal wage increases in response to the 
increased gap between the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage. The real wage 
increase is greater than that of the nominal wage, reflecting that it is jointly determined - by 
construction in this setting - by the dynamics of (decreasing) prices and of (increasing) nominal 
wages.  
According to our simulations, the nominal wage rigidities version of the NK model with labor 
market frictions has thus proven qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence on the 
labor market effects of technology shocks. Contrary to the BGM, the productivity-employment 
puzzle is restored and the predicted response of real and nominal wages is in line with the 
evidence.  
In the next section we examine in more detail the economic mechanisms that are responsible for 
the contradictory response of employment predicted by the alternative model specifications.  
 
3.4.     The employment response in detail: nominal vs real wage rigidities 
 
In the NK framework, following a positive supply shock, a rise in employment is possible only 
if demand increases more than productivity. Here we show that the key variable explaining the 
different dynamic performances of models A and B is the price mark-up, i.e. the gap between 
the real wage and the marginal product of labor. In both models, when a positive technology  
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shock hits the economy the real wage increases less than productivity. However, while in the 
model with real rigidities the real wage remains persistently below the marginal product of 
labor, in the nominal wage rigidities model the drop in the price mark-up is weaker and 
transitory. This is not surprising, since in Model A the price mark-up is directly determined by 
the rigidity we have imposed:  ()
t t
real
t l mp l mp w ˆ ˆ ˆ γ − = − . Note that the persistence of the negative 
price mark-up response to a technology shock is increasing in the degree of the real wage 
rigidity γ .  
Since the price mark-up dynamics is the driving force of marginal costs, the drop observed 
under real wage rigidities drives down marginal costs, leading to a reinforced and persistent 
drop in price inflation. This holds up consumption more than it happens with Model B. As a 
result in Model A, for reasonable positive values of γ , demand increases more than 
productivity, inducing firms to expand their use of labor.  
Diversely, in Model B, since  () ( )
t
w
t
wreal
t π π π − = , the real wage response to the positive supply 
shock is stronger, as it is the result of increasing nominal wages and of decreasing inflation. 
This explains the weaker negative response of the price mark-up. Our simulations show that, 
when nominal wage rigidities are assumed, the price mark-up fall is reduced by 2/3 and dies out 
very quickly (approximately two quarters). The moderate and temporary reduction of marginal 
costs generates a moderate drop in prices which is insufficient to help demand to match-up with 
productivity.         
This does not mean that Model A cannot in any case account for the negative conditional 
correlation between employment and productivity. From sensitivity analysis we have found that, 
other things equal, the productivity-employment puzzle re-emerges when the degree of real 
wage rigidity γ  goes below 0.14. This result is not particularly encouraging, as it implies that 
the model satisfies an important aspect of empirical consistency only when one of its distinctive 
assumptions becomes irrelevant. Clearly, the threshold value of γ  which is needed to observe 
the puzzle increases with σ  (consumption smoothing) and decreases with the monetary 
authorities’ degree of activism (accommodation). To give an idea of these relationships, 
consider that if logarithmic utility is assumed ( ) 1 = σ , the puzzle emerges with  12 . 0 < γ ; when 
the Taylor rule inflation parameter  dp ϕ  is increased to 2.0, the puzzle emerges with  10 . 0 < γ . A 
very high degree of consumption smoothing and/or a passive policy are thus needed to obtain 
the puzzle when assuming relevant real wage rigidities.    
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From this analysis it follows that, if the empirical consistency of the real wage stickiness model 
has to be restored - without questioning some established beliefs on NK models calibration - 
some additional ad-hoc frictions, such as habits persistence
15 and interest rate smoothing, are 
needed. Evidently, this would not be a satisfactory solution from a theoretical point of view, as 
it implies the imposition of additional hypotheses contradicting the NK declared purpose “to 
provide rigorous microeconomic foundations for the central elements of Keynesian economics” 
(Mankiw and Romer, 1991, p. 1).  
On this ground, the nominal wage staggering assumption is more appealing, since it solves the 
empirical drawbacks of the NK model with labor market frictions without demanding additional 
hypotheses but that of staggered contracting. Note however that these results strongly rely on 
the specific real rigidity we have considered. In further developments we will adopt a more 
flexible real wage rigidity hypothesis, such as an autoregressive distributed lag dynamic 
structure.  
 
 
4.     Methodology: Bayesian estimation and model selection 
 
The econometric literature has shown that, once enriched with relevant frictions, estimated NK-
DSGE models outperform standard reference forecasting tools such as ARIMA and Bayesian 
VARs (Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007; Del Negro, Shorfheide, Smets and Wouters, 2005). The 
main advantage of estimated DSGE models is however that results have a structural meaning, 
and thus a direct economic interpretation.
16  
The computational task in the estimation of DSGEMs is cumbersome, since the relevant 
nonlinearities of the models may compromise the performances of the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator. Even if a viable solution would be to restrict the 
                                                 
15 Smets and Wouters (2007) and Francis and Ramey (2005) find that the degree of habit persistence 
plays a fundamental role in the explanation of the negative impact of productivity on hours worked. 
 
16 This feature is precluded to other estimation approaches. For example, structural VARs provide only 
indirect identification, since their estimated coefficients are generally a convolution of the structural 
parameters of the reference theoretical model (Leeper and Zha, 2000). Because of this, SVARs are often 
referred to as “weakly identified” structures. This feature does not necessarily represent a pitfall of the 
methodology, since weak identification may allow the evaluation of alternative model predictions in an 
experimental trial in which different theories are nested. 
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estimates within a “reasonable” range (i.e. to employ a constrained FIML estimator), in our 
analysis we adopt a Bayesian Monte Carlo approach; in both cases the estimates depend on 
prior assumptions on the range of admissible values, but with the Bayesian approach priors are 
fully specified. The preferred technique can in fact be considered equivalent to constrained 
Maximum Likelihood from a Bayesian perspective, i.e. one in which restrictions (priors) are 
defined in terms of probability distributions. In Geweke’s (1999) terms, the Bayesian approach 
belongs to the “strong econometric interpretation of DSGE models”, which is alternative to the 
weak econometric interpretation of the calibration approach proposed by Kydland and Prescott 
(1996), where parameters are determined so as to obtain selected theoretical moments matching 
as closely as possible sample moments.   
The recent developments in Bayesian estimators offer effective tools for the evaluation of fully 
structural, micro-founded model specifications. The scope of Bayesian estimators is to get the 
posterior distribution for model parameters conditioning on prior beliefs on parameters and 
models  j M  and objective sample information. The methodology thus nests the formalized prior 
distribution  ( ) j M P , θ  for the vector of parameters  Θ θ∈ ,  and the conditional distribution 
(likelihood)  ( ) j T M P , |θ Y ,  {}
T
t t T y 1 = = Y   to get the posterior density  ( ) j T M P , |Y θ . This is 
basically obtained employing the Bayes rule: 
                                        () ( ) ( )
() j T
j j T
j T M P
M P M P
M P
,
, ,
,
Y
θ θ Y
Y θ =                                          (12) 
Since the posterior density is a complex and unknown multivariate distribution, its analytical 
calculation is not feasible for the general nonlinear case; for this reason, the posterior 
distribution is obtained via numerical integration.  
Operationally, we obtain the Bayesian MCMC posterior estimates employing the Kalman 
smoother
17 for approximating the conditional distribution and the Hastings-Metropolis 
algorithm (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970) for Monte Carlo integration.
18 
                                                 
17 The standard estimation procedure consists of the following steps. In the first step the DSGE model is 
linearized obtaining a linear rational expectation (LRE) model. The LRE is solved and the model is 
written in its state space form. In the next step, the likelihood function, incorporating empirical 
information, is computed using a standard Kalman filtering technique. 
 
18 To obtain drawings from the posterior distribution various MCMC methods are available. The different 
posterior simulation methods  are discussed in Geweke (1998). 
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The posterior distribution is basically the result of a weighted average of prior non sample 
information and the conditional distribution (i.e. the empirical information); weights are 
inversely related to, respectively, the variance of the prior distributions and the variance of the 
sample information (“precisions”). Formalizing a tight prior will thus result in highly 
constrained estimation, while a diffuse prior will result in weakly constrained estimation. 
Priors definition may simply reflect the analyst’s beliefs on deep parameters, or its prior 
knowledge obtained from micro or macro-econometric studies (Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide, 
2002). From a Bayesian point of view, the presence of subjective elements is an irreducible 
feature of any experimental trial: what is important is that they are formalized and incorporated 
in the analysis in an explicit and transparent manner.  
In our analysis, prior values will be defined according to objective results from previous 
analyses and to the conventional practice emerged in alternative theoretical investigations. Such 
a procedure is not free of serious limitations, since the validity domain of prior evidence is not 
independent of the way it has been obtained. It may happen that reasonable values for the 
parameters of a given model may result unreasonable for an alternative model. In the next 
section we will approach this problem by performing a stability mapping analysis from which 
we derive important indications for priors elicitation. 
 
4.1.     Mapping stability: Monte Carlo filtering 
 
When dealing with a Bayesian approach, the identification of the stability domain of the model 
is a fundamental step, as it allows to initialize estimation within the portion of the parameters 
space that fulfills the stability requirements. In most DSGE models the analytical derivation of 
the stability properties is very complex, if not unfeasible. In such cases a viable solution is 
provided by the Monte Carlo filtering (MCF) mapping procedure to detect which parameters 
mostly drive the model into an established region.
19  
Following Ratto (2006), we will distinguish between two regions: a target stable behavior 
region B satisfying the standard Blanchard-Kahn rank condition and an unacceptable behavior 
                                                 
19 We refer to a computational tool developed by M. Ratto –Joint Research Centre, European 
Commission. See Ratto,  Roeger , Veld and Girardi (2005b.) and Ratto (2006). The Dynare package, 
version 4, includes the MCF tool for mapping stability of the DSGE models (Juillard, 1996, 2005). 
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region  B . The unacceptable behavior may emerge because of model instability, indeterminacy, 
or  any other reasons impeding the solution of the model.  
Operationally, the Regionalized Sensitivity Analysis (RSA) for stability mapping is a multi-step 
procedure: in a first step, a multi-parameter simulation is performed and each Monte Carlo 
realization is categorized according to its positioning within or outside the target region, given 
the specific models  B A M ,  considered. Running N Monte Carlo draws we obtain, for each 
parameter  i = 1,2,…,k, the sub-samples ( ) B i / θ  and ( ) B i / θ , representing draws from the 
unknown probability density functions  ( ) B f i n θ  and  ( ) B f i n θ . The identification of the 
parameters most responsible for driving the model into the target region is then obtained by 
comparing the distributions  () B f i n θ  and  ( ) B f i n θ  by independent two-sided Smirnov-
Kolmogorov tests for each parameter: 
                                                    () ( ) ( ) B F B F d i n i n i n n θ θ θ − =sup ,                                         (13) 
The test is defined with respect to the cumulative distribution functions of  i θ ; by assuming 
() B f i n θ = ( ) B f i n θ  under the null hypothesis, and having defined the significance level α  at 
which the statistic  () i n n d θ ,  rejects the null, the greater  ( ) i n n d θ ,   the more important is  i θ  in 
driving model behavior. In this case there will be clearly identifiable subsets of values in the 
parameters’ predefined space that are more likely to fall under B   than under B .  
For each structural parameter of Model A and B we will distinguish, within the unacceptable 
region, between instability and indeterminacy. 
 
4.2     Model comparison: the Bayes factor 
 
The empirical performances of models A and B will be “naturally” compared according to the 
indications of the Bayes factor. Since it gives a summary of the evidence provided by the data in 
favor of one model specification with respect to the other, it represents the dominant approach 
to Bayesian model comparison. The Bayes factor is the ratio between the probability of having 
observed the data conditional to a model and the observational probability for the same data 
given the alternative model. Thus, it expresses to which extent the data support one model with 
respect to the other, or – in Bayesian terms - how much we should change our beliefs on the  
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probability of each model given the empirical evidence. It can be seen as the Bayesian analogue 
of likelihood ratio test.  
Let observables be  T Y  and assume we wish to test the two competing models,  A M and  B M , 
with parameter vectors  A θ  and  B θ . Considering the Bayes’ theorem, and assuming that both 
models are true, the posterior distribution (12) can be expressed in terms of models’ posterior 
probabilities, i.e.: 
                                    () ( ) ( )
() ()() () B B A A
A A
T A M P M P M P M P
M P M P
M P
Y Y
Y
Y
+
= ,                                (14) 
where   () () ( )   ,    , , , B A j d M P M P M P j j j j j T j T = =∫ θ θ θ Y Y  is the marginal distribution. The 
ratio between models’ posterior distributions (14) gives the posterior odds ratio, that can be 
expressed as the priors ratio  () ( ) B A M P M P  times the Bayes factor  ( ) () B T A T M P M P Y Y . 
Since we don’t have any prior model preferences, we assume  ( )() B A M P M P = , thus the 
posterior odds is equivalent to the Bayes factor  
                                                          ( )
() B T
A T
B A B A M P
M P
PO B
Y
Y
= = , ,                                               (15) 
Even if there are different posterior methods to calculate the marginal likelihood (Geweke, 
1998), following Schorfeide (1999) we employ the Laplace approximation method.
20 Note that 
the Bayes factor does not lead to a simple “accept” or “reject” decision, since it is a measure of 
relative support for the models and not an absolute measure of “goodness”. In drawing our 
conclusions, we will adopt the Jeffrey’s (1961) scale of evidence for assessing the log-Bayes 
factors’ indications.
21 
An additional feature of the Bayes factor is that it embodies a strong preference for 
parsimonious modeling. This issue is presumably irrelevant for our analysis, since only one 
                                                 
20 The Laplace approximation does not rely on any sampling method, since it considers the posterior 
mode, i.e. it applies a standard correction to approximate the marginal likelihood, assuming that the 
posterior distribution is close to a normal distribution. 
 
21 If  1
2 , 1 ≥
Y B , then model 1 is supported; if  1 10
2 , 1
2 / 1 < ≤
−
Y B , then slight evidence against model 1; if 
2 / 1
2 , 1
1 10 10
− − < ≤
Y B , then moderate evidence against model 1; if 
1
2 , 1
2 10 10
− − < ≤
Y B , then strong 
evidence against model 1; if 
2
2 , 1 10
− <
Y B , then decisive evidence against model 1 
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parameter makes Model A more parsimonious than Model B. However, such a bias can be 
controlled employing the Bayes factor correction ( ) N N k k B A log −  derived from the 
asymptotically equivalent Schwartz criterion.  
 
4.3    Data and prior distributions 
 
The sample employed is composed of quarterly data over the period 1957:1 – 2007:1 on six key 
macro variables of the United States: real wages, real consumption, CPI, the Federal funds rate 
(FFR), employment and unemployment. Wages and consumption are drawn from the BEA data 
base, employment and unemployment from the BLS data base, while the FFR is drawn from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics data base. Real variables are de-trended employing the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, while inflation and the nominal interest rate - because of their co-
trending behavior - are de-trended on the basis of the estimated linear component in inflation 
(Smets and Wouters, 2003).
22 
The first column of Table 3 summarizes our priors on the structural parameters of models A and 
B. For three structural parameters of the models we assume a certainty prior (i.e. they are not 
estimated). These are the discount factor, fixed at 0.99, and parameters B,  α  and φ , 
respectively fixed at 0.11, 1 and 1, in line with the calibration described in Section 2.1. Finally, 
the steady state values  ss x = 0.7 is assumed. The shape of the prior distributions is chosen 
according to the following standard assumptions: the reference distribution for the structural 
shocks is the inverted gamma distribution with two degrees of freedom, which is consistent with 
a diffuse prior on perturbations and positive variances; for parameters theoretically defined in a 
[0-1] range, we assume a beta distribution; for the other parameters we assume a normal 
distribution.  
For empirical identification, seven structural shocks are considered, respectively affecting: i) 
technology; ii) consumption preferences;  iii) labor disutility; iv) the price equation (cost push); 
v) the hiring cost; vi) monetary policy; vii) the monetary policy target (targeted inflation).  
Even if we assume that all the shocks are serially correlated, we adopt differentiated priors for 
the autoregressive coefficients on the basis of prior evidence and standard practice. Technology 
                                                 
22 Our results are robust to the particular filtering method employed. The estimates are qualitatively 
equivalent when the Baxter-King filter is used as de-trending procedure. 
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and monetary policy target shocks are assumed relatively persistent, with prior means (standard 
deviations) of, respectively 0.9 (0.2) and 0.75 (0.1). The autoregressive coefficients of 
preference and disutility of work shocks have a mean (s.d.) value of 0.5 (0.075), while for the 
other shocks very low persistence is assumed: we set a prior mean of 0.2 (0.1) for the cost push 
shock, of 0.25 (0.1) for the monetary policy shock and of 0.1 (0.05) for the hiring cost shock. 
This characterization of the serial correlation of shocks is needed to reproduce the typical 
persistence found in the data. It should not be considered a strong assumption, since it is 
commonly accepted that technology shocks have long-lasting effects, and that authorities, once 
committed on a given target, change their mind slowly (Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007). 
Concerning structural parameters, we choose a prior mean (s.d.) of 6 (0.2) for the elasticity of 
substitution among differentiated goods  p ε  and workers  w ε  (Model B only), a prior mean (s.d.) 
of 1.8 (0.3) for consumption curvature σ ,  and a prior mean (s.d.) of, respectively, 1.4 and 0.6 
(0.2 and 0.1) for the Taylor rule coefficients  π ϕ  and  u ϕ . For the Calvo price and wage 
stickiness parameters (Model B only) we set a diffuse prior with mean (s.d.) equal to, 
respectively, 0.6 (0.12) and 0.75 (0.12); the different price-wage Calvo priors are justified by 
previous empirical results (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001; Sbordone, 2001), while 
the large support is chosen to obtain weakly constrained estimates. Following Hall (1999) and 
Trigari (2006), the prior mean (s.d.) of the separation rate is set to 0.08 (0.04). Finally, in line 
with the calibration chosen by Blanchard and Galì (2006b), we set the (weakly informative) 
prior mean (s.d.) of the degree of real wage rigidities to 0.5 (0.350).  
Given the model assumptions described above, we estimate 21 parameters for Model A and 22 
parameters for Model B, of which 14 define the size and persistence of the 7 exogenous 
stochastic components. 
 
 
5.       Results 
 
From the MCF-RSA analysis we obtain that 86% of the chosen prior space for Model A is 
stable, while the remaining 14% leads to indeterminacy. No instability regions are present. In 
Model B 66.3% of the prior support is stable, 3.6% is unstable, and 30.1% leads to  
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indeterminacy. Model B is thus characterized by a significant portion of the pre-defined 
parameters’ space that turns out to violate the Blanchard-Kahn conditions. 
Table 4 shows the results of the Smirnov-Kolmogorov statistics in driving to acceptable 
behaviour. In Model A the occurrence of a stable behaviour is mainly due to the size of the 
unemployment coefficient ( u ϕ ) in the Taylor rule, and to the Calvo price parameter ( p θ ). Some 
role in driving to acceptable behavior is also found for the separation rate (δ ) and for the 
inflation coefficient ( dp ϕ ) in the Taylor Rule. Since the cumulative probability distributions for 
unacceptable behavior are shifted to the left, the probability of model stability increases with the 
size of ( u ϕ ), ( dp ϕ ), ( p θ ) and (δ ). In Model B the emergence of acceptable behavior depends 
on a larger set of parameters. The most important ones are the Calvo parameters in the price and 
wage setting equations ( p θ  and  w θ ), the separation rate (δ ), the elasticity of substitution 
among differentiated workers ( w ε ) and the unemployment coefficient ( u ϕ ) in the Taylor rule. 
The relative importance of these parameters is approximately the same. The Calvo nominal 
wage setting parameter ( w θ ) and the elasticity of substitution among differentiated workers 
( w ε ) are fundamental in driving the model to stability while they play no role in driving the 
model to indeterminacy. 
From these results we derive that, even if the two models show some relevant differences in 
stability properties under the pre-defined prior space, the choice of a comparable starting 
calibration can be employed for the initialization of the MCMC estimates.    
Parameters estimates are summarized in the second and third columns of Table 3, where we 
report the posterior mode estimates, with the associated standard errors approximated by the 
corresponding Hessian, and the MH posterior mean estimates, with the 5% and 95% percentiles 
values of the posterior distributions.  
A direct comparison of priors and posteriors can provide valuable indications on how data are 
informative for the parameter estimates (An and Schorfheide, 2006). On this respect, our results 
show that that the posterior means of all the deep parameters but γ  and σ  in Model A are 
relatively close to the respective prior means. This may signal either an appropriate prior 
selection or a weak contribution from the conditional distribution, i.e. from the data. In our 
opinion, the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. The models include largely analyzed 
equations, whose parameters are not problematic in terms of priors definition, and parameters  
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whose empirical identification depends on latent variables or on structural shocks that are less 
informative.  
An interesting and relevant exception is that the estimated degree of real wage rigidity γ  in 
Model A is only  0.023 and has a tight 90% support. This value is well below the chosen prior 
mean value of 0.5 and may lead to the emergence of the productivity-employment puzzle. We 
interpret this result, contradicting the real wage rigidity hypothesis advanced by Blanchard and 
Galì (1996b),
23 as providing evidence of a conflict between the data and the theoretical and prior 
assumptions: the empirical puzzle re-emerges as the degree of real wage rigidities tends to zero, 
since in this case – absent the labor market frictions - the model collapses to the BNKM. In 
other terms, the chosen prior value for γ  would lead to a positive employment response to the 
productivity shock that is not supported by the data.  
The slightly different values obtained for the Calvo price parameters are also worth mentioning. 
The price stickiness parameter obtained with Model A ( p θ = 0.948) is bigger than that obtained 
with Model B  ( p θ = 0.929). The estimated degree of price stickiness obtained with model B, is 
basically in line with the Euro Area estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003) and of Christoffel, 
Kuester and Linzert (2006), who find a posterior mean of, respectively, 0.909, and 0.92. 
However, it is higher than the US data evidence provided by Smets and Wouters (2007) (0.66) 
and by Rabanal and Rubio Ramirez (2005) (0.79).
24  
The Calvo  parameter for nominal wage setting in Model B (0.96) is bigger than that for price 
setting. This result is well documented in the literature.
25 
                                                 
23 Blanchard and Gali (2006) suggest that the degree of real wage rigidity can be obtained through a 
regression of real wage growth on productivity growth, which yields a coefficient between 0.3 and 0.4 
and so a degree of real wage rigidity between 0.6 and 0.7. 
 
24 The difficulty encountered in the estimation of the degree of inertia when employing the standard NK 
apparatus is an acknowledged fact in the literature. Eichnbaum and Fisher (2004) stressed that plausible 
degrees of inertia in price setting behavior can be obtained only if the two auxiliary assumptions of the 
Calvo (1983) model are relaxed: the constancy of the elasticity of demand faced by monopolistically 
competitive firms and the possibility to instantaneously reallocate capital after a shock. Altig, Christiano, 
Eichnbaum and Linde (2005) show that a firm specific capital model specification allows to obtain a 
reduced size of the price stickiness parameter.  
 
25 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) and Sbordone (2001) also find that nominal wage stickiness 
is more relevant than price stickiness. Smets and Wouters (2003) provide an economic explanation of this 
evidence: since labor suppliers’ marginal costs are upward-sloping, and the marginal cost is flat due to the 
constant returns to scale assumption, an upward bias of the Calvo parameter is determined. Assuming 
decreasing returns to scale and an upward-sloping marginal cost curve, Gali, Gertler and Lopez Salido  
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The estimated CRRA parameters σ  in Model A (1.14) and Model B (0.44) are below the prior 
means and remarkably different. Such a difference highlights the sensitivity of results to 
different model specifications, confirming the relevant difficulties in estimating the 
consumption curvature parameter addressed by the micro and macro-econometric literature.   
For both models, the estimated elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods  p ε  is 
basically in line with prior assumptions, implying similar mark-up values (nearly 19.9% and 
20.3% in, respectively, Model A and Model B). Despite the chosen prior mean is the same, the 
estimated elasticity of substitution among differentiated labor is lower ( w ε = 3.927, implying a 
mark-up in wage setting of 34%).  
The separation rate estimates are quite different in the two models. The posterior mean obtained 
with model A is 0.11, in line with the value of 0.12 suggested for the US by Blanchard and Gali 
(2006), which implies a steady state unemployment rate of about 4.5%.  On the contrary, in 
model B we obtain a posterior mean of 0.09, which is consistent with a steady state 
unemployment rate of about 3.7%.  
The parameters characterizing the Taylor rule are stable across models and close to the chosen 
prior mean. 
In line with prior assumptions and previous empirical studies, the productivity and the inflation 
target processes are the most persistent. The high persistence of these two shocks implies that at 
long horizons most of the variance of the variables is explained by these shocks. Contrary, the 
estimated persistence of the preference shock is well above its prior mean in both models.  
An interesting result is that the persistence of the hiring cost shock is very high in Model A 
while approximately null in Model B. A possible explanation is that the high degree of 
persistence found with Model A captures the neglected persistence of marginal costs. This does 
not happen with Model B, since in this case the marginal costs persistence is accounted for by 
the nominal wage rigidity.  
We now turn to discuss the Bayesian impulse responses to a positive technology shock in 
models A and B, reported in Figures 1 and 2. The first distinctive element is obviously found 
with respect to the real and the nominal wage dynamics. Following a positive supply shock, the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2000) estimate a reasonable degree of  price stickiness. The same result can be obtained by assuming that 
the capital stock is firm specific (Altig, Christiano, Eichnbaum and Linde, 2005). 
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real wage rises in both models, even if responses display a different shape; in Model A the real 
wage mirrors that of productivity, while in Model B it basically follows the nominal wage 
dynamics. Note that the real wage response at the impact is bigger in Model A than in Model B. 
On this respect, both models are thus consistent with the stylized facts of macro-dynamics. 
From the preliminary calibration analysis we obtained that the nominal wage drops in Model A 
and rises in Model B. Interestingly, this is no more the case when considering posterior impulse 
responses, since, coherently with the evidence, the nominal wage increases  in both models. 
The small size of the estimated rigidity parameter γ  thus implies that the dynamic properties of 
Model A, aside from labor market frictions, approximate those of the BNKM. This result leads 
to the second distinctive element in models properties. The very low posterior estimate of the 
degree of real wage rigidity γ  in Model A implies that it becomes dynamically consistent with 
the observed negative conditional correlation between productivity and employment.  
These results indicate that, when the real wage rigidities model is confronted with the data, the 
resulting parameterization makes it qualitatively consistent with the commonly acknowledged 
facts of business cycles, but this comes at the expenses of the real wage rigidity hypothesis 
itself. The only problematic result is that Model A still predicts an excessive stability of the real 
wage over the cycle. Aside from this empirical drawback, shall we conclude that Model A and 
B are empirically equivalent?   
To answer this question we have to consider the results of the Bayesian model selection 
analysis. Table 6 reports the posterior log-likelihood of models A and B considering the Laplace 
approximation. The Bayes factor  ( ) B A P P
Y B A e B
ln ln
,
− = =
52 − e . This means that, according to the 
Jeffreys’ (1961) scale, there is decisive evidence against model A.  
As anticipated in section 3.4, these results are potentially affected by the specific real rigidity 
hypothesis adopted. The consideration of an autoregressive distributed lag structure for the real 
wage rigidity may well affect our results, even if it would continue to lack well defined 
microeconomic foundations.  
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6.     Conclusions 
 
The NK model with labor market frictions recently proposed by Blanchard and Galì (2006b) 
solves three major limitations of the BNKM: the lack of unemployment, the “divine” 
coincidence between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output gap, and the lack of inflation 
persistence. However, this comes at the cost of generating other discrepancies between the 
model properties and observed business cycle dynamics. Our analysis shows that the 
assumption of relevant real wage rigidities makes the model inconsistent with the well 
documented productivity-employment puzzle and the positive response of the nominal wage to 
a supply shock.  
We have discussed the mechanisms leading to the counterfactual outcomes, stressing that the 
unsatisfactory model properties have the same origin. The imposed weak real wage response to 
a positive technology shock leads to a steep decline in inflation that, in turn, stimulates demand, 
counterbalancing the negative effects of price staggering. As a result, demand responds more 
than flexible prices output, leading to a rise in employment. The important deflationary 
implications of the real wage rigidity hypothesis also lead the model to predict nominal wage 
deflation, that mirrors price dynamics so as to guarantee the constant real wage share in 
productivity.  
We have clarified that this model can be rendered consistent with the productivity-employment 
puzzle by decreasing the degree of real wage rigidity below a threshold value which is 
increasing in the relative risk aversion parameter (consumption curvature) and decreasing in the 
degree of activism of monetary authorities. Despite this potential model flexibility, we have 
shown that, for a reasonable calibration, the threshold real wage rigidity value is so small that 
the rigidity hypothesis is itself rejected. In other terms, the empirical consistency of the model is 
recuperated only when, according to the chosen calibration, its real wage determination 
hypothesis collapses to the optimal real wage BNKM assumption.         
In order to theoretically overcome these model pitfalls without compromising the other 
advantages of the NK model with unemployment, we have proposed an alternative specification 
considering, along with labor market frictions, nominal wage rigidities in the place of real wage 
rigidities.  
The empirical performances of the two model alternatives have been evaluated on the basis of 
Bayesian estimates of the structural parameters and by means of Bayesian model comparison.  
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The analysis has shown that: i) the estimated degree of real wage rigidity is basically irrelevant; 
ii) the resulting posterior impulse responses of the two models are qualitatively similar and 
consistent with the evidence; iii) the model with real wage rigidities predicts an excessively 
smooth response of the real wage to the technology shock; iv) the model with nominal wage 
rigidities predicts a lower degree of inflation inertia than the real wage rigidity model. 
As long as Bayesian inference signals the degree to which the analyst should change its prior 
beliefs after having completed an empirical trial, the qualitative change in the predicted 
employment and nominal wage response in Model A indicates that the real wage rigidity 
hypothesis is not supported by the data.   
Because of the similar dynamic properties of the models, we have thus addressed the possibility 
that they are empirically equivalent. The relevance of this evaluation is evident in the fact that 
the observational equivalence would imply the irrelevance of the nominal in addition to the real 
wage rigidity hypotheses. In fact, if model A (with irrelevant real wage rigidities) encompasses 
Model B with parsimony, a BNKM with unemployment should be preferred. Using the log-
Bayes factor as a model selection device, we have shown that model B is supported by the data 
and that there is decisive evidence against model A.  
These outcomes show that, by considering nominal in the place of real wage frictions, the 
appealing features of the BGM can be maintained without questioning its consistency with other 
important stylized facts of macro-economic dynamics.   
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Table 2. Model B-specific equations 
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Table 3. Smirnov-Kolmogorov statistics  
  MODEL A  MODEL B 
 
SMIRNOV  STATISTIC IN DRIVING 
 
SMIRNOV  STATISTIC IN DRIVING 
 
ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR 
d-stat 
INDETERMINACY 
       d-stat 
ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR 
d-stat 
INDETERMINACY 
d-stat 
INSTABILITY 
d-stat 
u φ   0.480 0.413  0.188  0.151  0.130 
dp φ   0.127 0.110  0.066  0.060  0.093 
p θ   0.430 0.370  0.168  0.187  0.548 
w θ   - -  0.119  0.088  0.203 
p ε   0.050 0.043  0.038  0.029  0.062 
w ε   - -  0.167  0.037  0.750 
σ   0.104 0.090  0.091  0.079  0.150 
δ   0.179 0.154  0.140  0.109  0.123 
γ   0.052 0.045  -  -  - 
a ρ   0.077 0.066  0.023  0.016  0.071 
dp η ρ   0.026 0.023  0.026  0.019  0.059 
h η ρ   0.043 0.037  0.052  0.034  0.073 
λ ρ   0.028 0.024  0.046  0.035  0.068 
π ρ   0.040 0.035  0.030  0.025  0.052 
ξ ρ   0.037 0.032  0.046  0.038  0.086 
χ ρ   0.051 0.044  0.032  0.022  0.066  
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Figure 1. Theoretical impulse responses to a productivity shock. Models A and B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  36
Table 4. Priors and posterior estimates 
                                   PRIOR DISTRIBUTION                ESTIMATED MAXIMUM POSTERIOR                                       MH POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION 
                           mean       std       distr.         mode Hessian         mode Hessian         mean      5%         95%        mean        5%        95% 
                                    Model A-B                        Model A                  Model B                        Model A                            Model B                       
Structural parameters 
u φ   0.600  0.100  norm  0.476  0.107  0.606   0.233   0.576 0.405 0.757  0.609      0.453 0.762 
dp φ   1.500  0.200  norm  1.503  0.157  1.500   0.440    1.432  1.123  1.771  1.491    1.230    1.713 
p θ   0.600 0.120 beta  0.955  0.008  0.916    0.077  0.948  0.940  0.955  0.929    0.910    0.942 
p ε   6.000  0.200  norm  6.001  0.200  6.001   1.693    6.012  5.663  6.360  5.920    3.379    8.539 
 σ   1.400  0.500  norm  1.145  0.572  1.383   0.736    0.439  0.158  0.714  1.139   0.631    1.506 
 δ   0.080  0.040  norm  0.110  0.003  0.051   0.055    0.119  0.101  0.141  0.088    0.047    0.126 
 γ    0.500 0.350 norm  0.387  0.201  -  - 0.023  0.000  0.060 -  -  - 
w θ   0.750 0.120 norm  -  -  0.951    0.024  -  -  -  0.963    0.955    0.970 
w ε   6.000 0.200 beta  -  -  5.999    1.496    -  -  -   3.927  2.860  5.356 
Serial Correlation of Shocks 
a ρ      0.900 0.200 beta  0.923  0.018  0.954    0.045 0.936  0.896 0.974 0.960      0.946  0.972 
dp η ρ    0.200  0.100  beta  0.271  0.097  0.212   0.396    0.120  0.065  0.169  0.180    0.117    0.238 
h η ρ    0.010 0.050 beta  0.869  0.025  0.000  0.001  0.859  0.821  0.911  0.000    0.000    0.001 
λ ρ     0.250  0.100  beta  0.280  0.125  0.254   0.144    0.247  0.082  0.399  0.281    0.090    0.395 
π ρ     0.750 0.100 beta  0.811  0.051  0.902    0.085  0.917  0.887  0.951  0.894    0.866    0.926 
ξ ρ     0.500 0.075 beta  0.891  0.002  0.812  0.177  0.889  0.887  0.890  0.847    0.828    0.871 
χ ρ    0.500  0.075  beta  0.500  0.078  0.634   0.234    0.500  0.375  0.621  0.546    0.461    0.635 
Standard Deviations of Innovations 
a σ   0.010 2* invg    0.007  0.002  0.010    0.001  0.004  0.003  0.005  0.010    0.009    0.011 
η σ   0.010  2*  invg  0.002  0.000  0.002   0.001    0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002    0.002    0.003 
hir η σ   0.010  2*  invg   1.764  0.954  0.003   0.002    1.115  0.896  1.316  0.006    0.004    0.011 
λ σ   0.010  2*  invg   0.002  0.000  0.003   0.002    0.005  0.002  0.007  0.281    0.090    0.395 
π σ   0.010  2*  invg   0.034  0.005  0.106   0.184    0.046  0.032  0.060  0.894    0.866    0.926 
ξ σ   0.010  2*  invg  0.026  0.005  0.016   0.007    0.021  0.020  0.023  0.847    0.828    0.871 
χ σ   0.010  2*  invg   0.011  0.013  0.106   0.073    0.008  0.002  0.015  0.546    0.461    0.635 
*For the inverted gamma distributions degrees of freedom are indicated. Note: Parameter estimates using 100000 draws in the 
MH algorithm. Number of MH blocks: 3. Acceptation rates: -Model A- 0.34706, 0.35583, 0.35869; -Model B- 0.3876, 
0.33692, 0.38069.  
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Figure 2. Bayesian impulse responses to a productivity shock. Model A                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
 
Figure 3. Bayesian impulse responses to a productivity shock. Model B 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
                                                                                        
                                                                               
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Log-data densities for model comparison  
  Log data density Laplace Approximation 
 
MODEL A 
 
3694.304 
MODEL B 3746.261 
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